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CRIMINAL LAW; OBSCENITY
Adds to NRS Chapter 201
Amends NRS 201.250
AB 143 (Stewart); STATS 1979, Ch 267
Chapter 267 amends and restructures Nevada's law on obscenity by amending
NRS 201.250 and adding several new sections to NRS Chapter 201.
Standards of Obscenity
In response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v.
1
California, NRS 201.250 has been amended. 2 Prior law 3 applied the tests created in
Roth v. U.S. 4 and Memoirs v. Massachusetts. 5 Chapter 267 discards the RothMemoirs tests and incorporates the Miller standards. 6 Now obscenity is defined as
that which, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests and lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 7 This standard is measured by the average
person applying contemporary community standards. 8
Chapter 267 further incorporates the examples of obscenity suggested in
9
Miller and in Ward v. Illinois.10 Material is obscene if it lewdly exhibits the
12
11
genitals or depicts in a patently offensive way a) ultimate sexual acts;
b)
. or excretory f unctions;
.
13 or c ) sad.Ism or masoc h.Ism.14
mas t ur b a t Ion
Procedure
Chapter 267 adds several provisions to NRS Chapter 201. Those new sections
provide both civil and criminal procedures for the prosecution of obscenity.
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Civil
Chapter 267 provides that a district attorney or city attorney may file a
complaint in the district court, seeking to have materials declared obscene and to
enjoin their sale, manufacture, distribution, and possession, except for personal
use.15 Ordinarily when an injunction is sought, the plaintiff must file security for
costs and damages which may be caused by wrongful restraint.16 In an action to
enjoin the sale or distribution of obscenity, however, such an undertaking need not
be filed. 17 Furthermore, threat of irreparable injury need not be shown before a
preliminary injunction is issued.18 Previously, NRS 201.250 provided that the person
sought to be enjoined was entitled to a trial within ten days of injunction and a
decision within ten days of trial. Chapter 267 deletes this requirement without
substitution.19 If the material is found to be obscene, the final judgment shall order
the material surrendered to the sheriff who is to destroy it. 20 The sheriff is not
liable for damages if judgment is ultimately rendered in favor of the enjoined
party. 21 After the judgment, if the defendant sells the obscene material, or a
substantially identical item, the value of the consideration received must be paid to
the prosecuting city or county. 22
Criminal
Chapter 267 provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor who knowingly
a) produces obscene material for commercial distribution; b) publishes, sells, rents,
or transports obscene material in intrastate commerce; c) distributes or offers to
commercially distribute obscene material; or d) possesses obscene material with
intent to commercially distribute. 23 The defendant is charged with knowledge of
the contents of the material after being served with the summons and complaint in
an action to declare the material obscene. 24
Additionally, anyone who requires a purchaser to accept obscene materials as
a condition to the purchase of other materials is guilty of a misdemeanor. In such a
case, it is also a misdemeanor to threaten a penalty for refusual to accept obscene
materials. 25 Chapter 267 does not provide a penalty for conviction. 26 Therefore,
NRS 193.150 would probably apply: anyone convicted of violating the provisions of
Chapter 267 could be punished by imprisonment for up to six months or a fine of up
to $500 or both.
In an action to declare material obscene, the circumstances of its production
and distribution may be considered. Evidence that the material was commercially
exploited for its prurient appeal (pandering) is probative of its obscene character
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and can justify a conclusion that the material is without serious literary, artistic,
. t"f"
pol1•t•1c al , or sCien
1 1c value. 27
Regulation
Counties, cities, and towns are free to adopt ordinances regulating obscenity
so long as they are not in conflict with Chapter 267. 28
Chapter 267 exempts certain organizations from its provisions. NRS 201.250
through NRS 201.254 and Chapter 267 sections 3 through 9 do not apply to state
universities, schools, museums and libraries, state political subdivisions, and employees of these organizations. 29
Comment
The Supreme Court has held that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press. 30 Additionally, freedom of speech is not
an absolute right 31 and certain forms, specifically obs~enity, may be regulated by
the state. 32 Nevada has historically, through NRS 201.250 and similar laws,
regulated obscenity within its borders. 33 The purpose of this Comment is to describe
the case law from which Nevada's present obscenity law is derived, how Chapter 267
conforms to that case law, and how it differs.
Obscenity Standards
34

Chapter 267 adopts the definition of obscenity formulated in Miller.
However, many problems remain unresolved in applying the Miller standard. Chief
among the issues not yet fully resolved in the problem of defining "community." As
explained in Hamling v. U.S., 35 Miller rejected a nationwide standard for defining
obscenity. 36 For basically the same reasons that a nationwide standard is not
required, neither is a statewide standard. 37 The problem lies in determining the size
and composition of "community." Nevada defines "community" as the area from
which a jury would be selected for the court in which the action is tried. 38 Once
39
the community is defined, the jurors must determine its standards. Smith v. U.S.
defined "community standard" as the measure against which the jury determines
appeal to prurient interests and patent offensiveness. 40 The jurors must draw upon
their own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community.
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41

In addition to the problem of defining community standards, there is a question
as to whose standards within the community are to be applied. Chapter 267 states
that prurient appeal is to be measured against ordinary adults, unless the material
appears to be designed for a clearly defined group. 42 The court in Mishkin v.
43
N.Y.,
although applying the Roth 44 test prior to Miller, 45 held that prurient
appeal may be measured against members of the deviant group to which the
material is directed. 46 The reference to the "average" person in Roth did not
prevent this holding. 47 Chapter 267 appears to be following this line of~oning. 48
Additionally, Chapter 267 allows prurient appeal to be measured against
standards for children. 49 However, NRS 201.265 prohibits the sale or exhibit of
materials which are harmful to minors in such a manner that a child could view the
materials. "Harnful to minors" is defined as materials which appeal to the prurient
interest of minors, are patently offensive to community adult standards of what is
suitable for minors, and are utterly without redeeming social importance for minors
(NRS 201.257). Chapter 267 does not amend these sections. This creates a variable
standard of obscenity: one for adults and one for minors. As a result, materials not
obscene for adults might be found "harmful to minors" and could therefore be
restricted. 50
A New York statute similar to NRS 201.265 was upheld in Ginzburg v. New
51
York.
The court held that the well-being of children was within the State's
52
constitutional power to regulate,
and that the term "harmful to minors" is not
53
unconstitutionally vague. Nevada's variable standard, then, appears proper. 54
These remains, however, a discrepancy between NRS 201.250 and NRS 201.257.
NRS 201.250 requires the obscene character of an item to be determined by the
Miller standard as applied to children. 55 NRS 201.257, however, does not conform to
the Miller standard: it contains the utterly without redeeming social importance
test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts 56 which was expressly rejected in Miller, 57 and
applies this test to an expanded realm of sexual conduct. 58 The questions are
whether the Miller stand&rd wil be applied in NRS 201.265 regulating material which
is harmful to minors, and if so, whether potential violators will have sufficient
notice of the proscribed conduct. 59
Chapter 267 further expands upon the Miller standards by incorporating sadomasochism in its definition of obscenity. 60 Miller did not include sado-masochism in
its examples of obscenity. 61

However, in a later case the court held that sado-

masochistic materials are not protected by the First Amendment solely because
they were not included in the Miller example. 62 Evidently, then, the Miller
54

examples are not exclusive.

The question remains as to whether Chapter 267 as

worded applies only to the materials specified in Section 10.
Prior Restraint
Although obscenity is not protected speech, as established by Roth v. U.S., 63
speech is protected until it is determined to be obscene. Chapter 267 allows a
prelimnary injunction to be issued before trial of the issue of obscenity. 64 The
question arises as to whether this is an invalid prior restraint. Because prior
restraint freezes speech, 65 any system of prior restraints carries a heavy burden
against its constitutional validity. 66
In Freedman v. Maryland67 the Court
established some guidelines to prevent censorship of protected speech: a) restraint
must be limited to preserving the status quo and for the shortest period compatible
with sound judicial procedure; 68 b) prompt final judicial determination must be
69
assurect;
c) adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expresssion
must be provided. 70 Previous law in Nevada required a trial within ten days of
injunction and a decision within ten days of the trial. 71 This requirement has been
deleted by Chapter 267; there is no longer a requirement that the issue be brought
to trial within a certain time. It apepars that Nevada has created a system of prior
72
restraint without incorporating the safeguards suggested in Freedman v. Maryland.
Pandering
Chapter 267 allows evidence of the circumstances of the sale of publicity of
an item to be considered in determining its obscene character. Evidence that it is
being commercially exploited for its prurient appeal is probative of obscenity.
Furthermore, this evidence can justify the conclusion that the item is without
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 73 In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 74 the court held that evidence of commerical exploitation of a book's prurient
appeal could justify the conclusion that it was utterly without redeeming social
importance. 75 Nevada adopts this holding, substituting the "without serious value"
test of Miller. 76 Splawn v. California 77 also held that pandering to prurient interest
is relevant to determining the obscene character of an item. 78 In Splawn the court
upheld instructions directing the jury to consider the circumstances of sale in
making its decision. The wording of these instructions is substantially the same as
that of Chapter 267, section 6. 79
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A word of caution, however:

The Memoirs court suggested that all possible
uses of the publication must be considered. 80 Although evidence of pandering may
be determinative of obscenity, "where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the
sexually provocative aspects" of the publication, 81 it cannot change the fact that
the publication may be of redeeming social importance "in the hands of those who
publish or distribute it on the basis of that value.1182
Scienter
Chapter 267 provides that the production, exhibit, or sale of obscenity is a
misdemeanor. 83 In order to be convicted, the defendant must have knowingly
performed these acts. 84 In Smith v. California, 85 the Court struck down a statute
creating absolute liability for possession of obscene materials for sale. While
holding that a statute must require an element of scienter for conviction, the Court
declined to define the type of scienter required. 86 Other cases have held, however,
that the defendant need only have had notice of the contents and character of the
87
88
materials.
This could mean as little as mere "awareness."
Scienter does not
depend upon the defendant's opinion or belief regarding the character of the
89
materials.
Additionally, Chapter] 67 provides that the defendant is charged with
knowledge of the contents of an item after service of summons and complaint in an
action to declare the item obscent. 90 A similar statute in New York was upheld in
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown. 91
Noreen M. Evans
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